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The Dialectic of the General and Particular in Social  
Science Research and Teaching Praxis 
Wolff-Michael Roth* 
Review Essay: Carol R. Ember & Melvin Ember (2001). Cross-Cultural  
Research Methods. Lanham, MD: Altamira Press, 164 pages; ISBN 0-7425-
0427-1. 
 
Abstract: “Cross-Cultural Research Methods” pretends to 
be a primer on the “how to” of conducting cross-cultural re-
search, but focuses only on quantitative methods that use 
secondary data in the service of generating knowledge. The 
book is caught twice in the dialectic of the general and the 
specific, by putting all its eggs into the former basket and 
failing to recognize the role of the latter both in research it-
self and in the teaching of research methods to its readers. 
Because I know that the students in my graduate research 
methods course would fail to appreciate the book, I would 
neither select nor recommend it to others as a resource in 




“This is a ‘how to’ book” (p.vii). Thus starts this little volume on one cross-
cultural research method.– rather than the plural version, methods, of the title 
promises. This title is probably misleading, for how would a book that intro-
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duces readers to the logic of quantitative cross-cultural research into the list of 
media units of a journal dedicated to qualitative research?  
This book fundamentally is about how to use existing ethnographic studies 
as (secondary) sources for comparing at once not just two but many cultures 
distributed across the globe. It is immediately evident that such comparisons 
require a reductionist approach, where complex cultures are reduced to a few 
measures on variables that are of interest to the researcher. Going through the 
existing literature, taking information from it to provide a score on a salient 
variable, and using the scores in statistical analyses to reject or accept hypothe-
ses of differences or relationships generated a priori on the basis of some the-
ory require attention to particular problems and contingencies. The authors 
promise to provide a practical approach to these problems and contingencies. 
Apart from the fact that some of the fundamental presuppositions one has to 
make in such research have not been discussed, I found the book fraught with 
problems arising from the general/specific dialectic that will make it difficult 
for novices to learn from the book. That is, the authors are so deeply caught in 
their paradigm of generalizing that not only their research but also their teach-
ing dwells in the general; they do not realize that without understanding the 
specific it is impossible to understand the general.  
The relationship between the general and specific is fundamental to dialecti-
cal materialism (IL’ENKOV 1977); it is also, perhaps in some guise, central to 
hermeneutic phenomenology (RICŒUR 1991). The experience of the specific, 
concrete world of objects and events always precedes the understanding of 
theory. HUSSERL (1973, p.61) expresses this MARXist insight in his aphoris-
tic statement, “Die Praxis steht überall und immer voran der ‘Theorie’” [Praxis 
always precedes theory]. For RICŒUR (1991), the general/specific dialectic is 
expressed in the parallel dialectic of understanding/explaining, whereof under-
standing is always grounded in lived experience. Thus, all explaining requires 
prior understanding. We cannot engage in the analysis of any text or action 
without always already having a practical understanding of the world. But 
understanding requires explaining, engagement in structural analysis, in order 
to unfold and develop pre-existing understanding. Without explaining we 
would be stuck in ideology unable to overcome our preconceptions. This gen-
eral/specific dialectic operates within the paradigm presented by the authors 
and also creates problems for readers who attempt to understand the lesson of 
the book, but have to fail unless they already have an understanding of the 
method, some cultures, and cross-cultural comparisons.  
Before articulating some of these problems, I provide a brief description of 
the content and structure of the book. I then discuss the book under three as-
pects: I comment on (a) the role of the particular and the general in learning, 
(b) the relationship between ideology and method, and (c) coding.  
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2. Structure and Contents 
The authors structured the book more or less along the temporal dynamic of a 
research project. Beginning with the presentation of the logic of cross-cultural 
research (Chapter 1), they proceed to the formulation of the research question 
(Chapter 2); the role of theories and hypotheses (Chapter 3); problems related 
to the measurement of variables (Chapter 4); the sources of error and the im-
pact errors have on the power of statistical analysis (Chapter 5); identification 
of the sampling domain (population) and issues of selecting appropriate proce-
dures for selecting the sample on which the generalization to the domain is 
conducted (Chapter 6); issues arising from coding in secondary data (Chapter 
7); an introduction to the logic of some of the basic statistical procedures 
(Chapter 8); and questions concerning the reliability of coders (Chapter 9). A 
brief summary (Chapter 10), an appendix (in which a large database for con-
ducting cross-cultural research is explained), a glossary, and reference and 
index sections conclude the book.  
In “The Logic of Cross-Cultural Research” (Chapter 1) the authors lay out 
some of the assumptions of the kind of research they conduct. Among these 
assumptions they list: the use of variables and measurement as prerequisites for 
cross-cultural comparisons, generalization based on statistical inference, the 
use of contingency tables, the distinction between synchronic and diachronic 
comparison, and the need to have variability as a precondition for doing quanti-
tative work in cross-cultural research. They forget to note.– or perhaps fail to 
understand.– that in the scientific paradigm that they pretend to espouse, causal 
relationships require experimental variation of the independent variable. Draw-
ing on observation-based data, they cannot try “to see how cultural traits may 
be causally related to each other” (p.16). If the causal relationships are derived 
from theory, procedures other than experiment.– for example, intuition and 
understanding-based elaboration.– have been used to establish causal relation-
ships.  
The brief Chapter 2 provides a classification of different types of research 
questions (causal, consequence, and relational), and an explanation of the dif-
ference between dependent and independent variables. The chapter fails to note 
that interesting research questions, those that expand the knowledge of the 
field, cannot be framed unless one knows the field, ascribes to its assumptions 
and values, and is familiar with the going (acceptable) theories.  
The brief Chapter 3 deals theories and hypotheses, explains the difference 
between them, describes the nature of scientific laws, and provides demonstra-
tions why theories cannot be proven and why hypotheses can only be falsi-
fied.– based on POPPER’s (1959) articulation of the logic of scientific discov-
ery, which social scientists consider to be pretty well passé.  
In Chapter 4, “The Art of Measurement”, the authors articulate issues sur-
rounding reliability and validity, explain and exemplify the differences between 
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nominal, ordinal, and interval and ratio measures, and discuss the differences 
between face, content, and convergent validity. Readers can find a brief exposé 
on GUTTMAN scales, which are hierarchically ordered descriptors so that a 
higher order descriptor normally includes the presence of all lower order de-
scriptions. There is also discussion of primary data, usually gathered by re-
searchers themselves in the service of a particular research or research pro-
gram, versus secondary data, derived from existing ethnographic texts that 
were written on the basis of very different intentions.  
How to minimize error and how errors affect the detection of presumed 
(causal, correlational) relationships is the topic of Chapter 5. The authors dis-
cuss random and systematic error, the relationship between levels of inference 
to be made in coding and the level of error that is likely to occur, the effect 
different timeframes (under which primary data were collected) have on error, 
how to minimize ethnographer, informant, and data coder errors, and how to 
check the quality of data.  
Sampling issues constitute the content of Chapter 6; these issues are particu-
lar to cross-cultural research based on secondary data, for the existing literature 
does not cover all cultures with equal depth and breadth. Thus, researchers 
interested in making quantitative cross-cultural comparisons for making gener-
alizations valid to a population of cultures, need to be careful in selecting their 
sampling frame so that its random sampling from the frame becomes represen-
tative of the population that the generalization is to be about. A large multi-
page table lists similarities and differences between databases and articulates 
some of the advantages and disadvantages of working with each. The authors 
describe different databases and how to use “proportionate” or “disproportion-
ate stratified sampling” to meet the need of their research. GALTON’s prob-
lem, concerning the lowered validity of cross-cultural generalizations when 
information on two or more cultures is not independent.– because of historical 
ties between the cultures.– is introduced in a way that leads me to conclude that 
it is a significant issue in the culture represented by the authors.  
Some generic information on coding and the problem of unreliable coders as 
well as a coding example constitute the contents of the relatively brief Chapter 
7. The chapter is annoying in the attitude it, as the entire book, takes with re-
spect to coders.– who are both cheap (why they don’t do a good job) and ex-
pensive labor (why researchers can’t hire as many as they want), depending on 
the context; most coders therefore cannot be trusted inherently. Also, the au-
thors specify that the preference to keep coders “in the dark about hypotheses” 
(p.94) because they might contaminate the data, a recommendation that most 
qualitative researchers would reject as unethical and undesirable.  
Chapter 8 introduces the reader to the logic of using statistics for summariz-
ing quantitative data (e.g., why and when to use the measures of central ten-
dency mean, median, or mode) or for making inferences about relationships 
between different kinds of variables based on their use of categorical, ordinal, 
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interval and ratio measures including t-tests, analysis of variance, chi-square 
and FISHER’s exact tests, and correlations. The authors introduce the idea of 
tests of significance (p-values), without nevertheless articulating, for example, 
why a p-value of 0.05 is the hallmark for rejecting or accepting hypotheses or 
the relationship between the p-value and the number of cases in the sample.  
The final substantive Chapter 9 is devoted to issues of reliability in its vari-
ous forms pertaining to test-retest (how similar are a persons results on the 
same or similar tests taken twice), inter-observer (how similar do two observers 
rate the same situation), and inter-rater situations (how similar do two raters 
rate the same piece of given data). It highlights once again the fundamental 
distrust the authors have in observers and coders, as being biased and not fol-
lowing coding instructions. The authors discuss four approaches of dealing 
with different coding: using one (more trustworthy) rater’s codings, summing 
or averaging codes, resolving differences, or dropping cases in which raters 
have “serious” disagreements.  
3. Some Comments 
In addition to extensive experience in qualitative research, my background 
includes a formation as a physicist and statistician. Reading the book came 
easy to me in one sense, because I was familiar with the various aspects of the 
research method presented in the book. On the other hand, in many places, the 
text presumes a prior understanding of the field as a whole and of quantitative 
cross-cultural research in particular. I attempted to come to grips with the role 
my own familiarity plays in reading the book, by trying to see the task from a 
novice’s perspective. I found that with respect to the statistical aspects, too, the 
book assumes too much background understanding to be useful to, for exam-
ple, the graduate students teach in introductory research designs courses. I 
traced the uneasiness to the use of general descriptions and cooked up, fake 
examples that are impossible to understand unless one is also familiar with 
concrete cases. That is, the authors wrote a book that was supposed to be prac-
tical with too many non-practical examples to make sense. Here, I consider the 
use of examples from the natural sciences as inappropriate because the con-
cerns in those fields are very different than in the social sciences. – I consider 
them inappropriate even if they had not been tainted by wrong conceptions, as 
this is the case in the present volume.1  
                                                 
1  As a physicist and science educator, I cringed when I read examples given in the context of 
measurement. The authors have a misunderstanding about temperature as a proxy of heat 
(p.37), which of course is only the case when everything else is the same. But one cannot 
compare the heat of two substances by comparing their temperature, as claimed by the au-
thors, for (a) only changes in heat can be obtained and (b) changes in heat involve other 
parameters such as mass and heat capacity. Furthermore, the authors claim that molecules 
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3.1 On the role of the particular and the general in learning 
The authors teach the advantages and disadvantages of correlational research 
by drawing on graphs (e.g., Figure 1.2, p.15) of the same type that our research 
shows give trouble even to research scientists with 6 to 25 years of experience 
(ROTH, BOWEN & MASCIOTRA 2002). Reading and interpretation require 
previous understanding, which can be developed through critical analysis 
(RICŒUR 1991). When, however, the text dwells in abstract statements, stu-
dents will find it difficult to grasp its meaning. The following two statements 
are but examples from the domain of using generic objects and descriptions 
when concrete, meaningful cases should have been used to assist the novice 
reader for whom, as one can infer from the second statement, the book was 
evidently designed: 
“You could say that the Society X people have this unique [pottery] design 
because it is customary, but this answer is an uninformative tautology. It 
merely says that they have this design because they had this design before.” 
(p.22) 
“If you find the terms dependent and independent variable confusing, think 
of independent as free to vary and the dependent variable as not free to vary 
because it depends on some other trait.” (p.23, emphasis in the original)  
Both examples suffer from the lack of specificity that would allow novice 
readers to make connections to their own experiences: any mathematics’ 
teacher knows the difficulties many students face in thinking about Xs and Ys. 
Praxis always precedes theory. If readers do not have concrete cases, how are 
they to understand and develop theory? We do understand the general because 
we already have had lived experience with and prior understanding of the par-
ticular. We do not understand the general in the absence of the particular, in the 
same way that we cannot have thoughts (noesis) without content (noema). One 
does not understand the meaning of dependent and independent variables by 
providing another description of the two and in the absence of suitable exam-
ples from the everyday world of the reader.  
The same case can be made for the use of hypothetical case material. For 
example, take the following rallied by the authors in the service of making 
inferences about the differences between two conditions or cases. 
“Assume we are comparing two societies with different levels of fertility. 
We may think that the difference is due to a greater need for child labor in one 
                                                                                                      
can come to an absolute standstill (p.41), which is wrong because it would violate the un-
certainty principle. According to the authors, "energy is generated when molecules are 
moving" (p.37), when in fact energy is simply a state variable allowing one to track systems 
given the principle of conservation of energy. The authors claim that water freezes because 
of the relation between state (ice, water) and temperature (p.28), when in fact water has a 
constant temperature while it freezes, 0 °C, and the change in state is not a function of the 
temperature but a function of the change in order (physicists call it entropy). 
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society because there is more agricultural and household work to be done in 
that society.” (p.76)  
The authors suggest that the inference may sound plausible. But it is not 
immediately evident why fertility.– at least if defined as a biological concept 
rather than birth rate.– ought to be a function of social factors such as need for 
child labor. If someone has trouble seeing that the example “may sound plausi-
ble”, then it will be difficult to impossible to follow the argument that the au-
thors attempt to make.  
The larger context of the example is also interesting because the authors 
claim that the difference between two cases cannot be attributed to the differ-
ence on another variable. This may be true for the kind of data that these au-
thors work with, but it is not true in general. The very logic of analysis of vari-
ance in the context of experimental research is aimed at identifying whether or 
not one variable, such as different teaching methods, has a causal relation to 
another, such as student learning outcomes (as measured by a posttest). Al-
though there are some concrete examples and even a coding exercise, the text 
remains too aloof from the concerns that a beginner would have to be useful. 
Thus, the entire chapter on statistical analysis is of little value unless the reader 
already knows statistics; yet, as the above quote shows, the authors expect that 
some readers may not even be familiar with the difference between dependent 
and independent variables. Furthermore, it was difficult to understand just what 
the different databases consist of, how they present themselves, how one 
searches for information. Thus, I found it difficult to grasp the entire discussion 
of and comparison between different databases. Some concrete rendering of 
bits of information would have helped a long way.  
3.2 On ideology and method 
The book suffers from an unresolved tension between the concrete and the 
abstract, the general and particular, both in its theoretical underpinning and in 
the way that the material is being presented. The authors seem to be unin-
formed of some of the important research on coding, and the role that knowl-
edge of particulars informs the work of coding (GARFINKEL 1967).  
BOURDIEU (1992) noted that the greatest enemies of research are re-
searchers themselves, when they engage in “abstraction which ignores itself as 
such” (p.226). BOURDIEU particularly writes against the empire of those 
monomaniacs of individual methods, bending the entire world to fit their Pro-
crustean beds of their choice. Above all, BOURDIEU notes that researchers are 
caught in the preconstructed that is everywhere. Thus, the cross-cultural an-
thropologist as 
“[t]he sociologist is thus saddled with the task of knowing an object.– the 
social world.– of which he is the product, in a way such that the problems that 
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he raises about it and the concepts he uses have every chance of being the 
product of this object itself.” (p.235)  
This book lacks a reflective and reflexive approach. In this day and age, I 
would have expected a book with Cross-Cultural Research Methods (note the 
plural!) as title to be more reflective about its own presuppositions. For exam-
ple, the authors make the fundamental assumption that “similarities cannot be 
seen or recognized until we think in terms of variables, qualities or quantities 
that vary along specified dimensions” (EMBER & EMBER, p.4). There are not 
only serious critiques of the variable approach (e.g., HOLZKAMP 1991) but 
also (dialectical) alternatives for thinking about generalization, how to achieve 
it, and its relation to the specific and concrete (IL’ENKOV 1977).  
There is a continuum of representations, beginning with originary, lived 
biographical experience on one side and highly abstracted structural formal 
symbols, often mathematical equations, on the other side; this continuum has 
been articulated in terms of world/sign (LATOUR 1993) and testimony 
[Zeugnis]/structure (MÜLLER 1973) oppositions. Abstracting from experi-
ence, that is, going from the world/testimony pole toward the sign/structure 
pole requires work, summarizing over many experiences and testimonies. This 
work is done in “centers of calculation” (LATOUR 1987). This work is not 
expended in vein, for it is related to observing many cases, lending itself to 
generalization and knowledge. Because observation, like surveillance, knows 
something about many testimonies, however little this may be, this knowledge 
is associated with power and control.  
“La surveillance devient un opérateur économique décisif, dans la mesure 
où elle est à la fois une pièce interne dans l’appareil de production, et un rouage 
spécifié dans le pouvoir disciplinaire.” (FOUCAULT 1975, p.206)2 
The fundamental questions, “Cui bono?”, that is, “Who benefits from this 
research?” and “Whose power is supported by such analysis?” never seem to be 
asked. Whose interests are served with cross-cultural comparisons that take a 
Western epistemology as ARCHIMEDES’ point of absolute reference? A little 
does of HABERMAS (1971), and interrogation about the interests that are 
served with this kind of research, and a bit of “radical doubt” (BOURDIEU 
1992) with the authors’ own preconceptions would allow readers to evaluate 
much better the relative value with, and problems of, the methodology elabo-
rated here.  
 
                                                 
2  This sentence translates about like this: "The surveillance becomes a decisive economic 
operator to the extent that it is both an internal piece of the production machinery and a 
specified set of wheels in disciplinary power." 
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3.3 On coding 
Quantitative researchers (monomaniacs?) attempt to purge interpretation and 
the role of experience from their research. Interestingly enough, interpretation 
and experience, which play a central role in understanding hermeneutics, creep 
into the quantitative paradigm, and especially during coding. The EMBERs 
repeatedly discuss the problem of having coders go through textual materials 
and code them not only in consistent but in fact in the same way. These au-
thors, as others working in the same paradigm, fail to deal with the questions 
why different coders may be coding differently and more poignantly, why 
different coders may code some text or situation in the same way. The more 
limited assumption is that there is a truth out there accessible to all intelligent, 
willing, and careful people/analysts. A broader and less stringent assumption 
would be that common codings are the exceptions and therefore need to be 
explained. There are two issues to be raised, the first dealing with the relation 
between coder and situation the second with the relation between coders of the 
same situation.  
First, the coding issue arose and was subsequently researched in a project 
where sociologists wanted to find out about the work processes and social 
organization in psychiatric clinics by reconstructing them from the clinics’ 
records (GARFINKEL 1967). Studying the processes by means of which 
graduate students coded these records, GARFINKEL came to the conclusion 
that the coders’ understanding of how clinics work allowed them to arrive at 
conclusions about what the records say. That is, understanding how clinics 
worked already entered the coding of the data, although how clinics work was 
supposed to be inferred from the codes. Coders arrive at definitive codings 
even if the documents are only marginally adequate. Thus, coders 
“will be able, there and then, to contrive ways of dealing with these difficul-
ties, and are able to do this because they are able to draw upon their under-
standings of which things may possibly, and actually, happen in places like 
psychiatric clinics.” (SHARROCK & BUTTON 1991, p.150)  
Second, we can infer, therefore, that different coders equally familiar with 
the objects and phenomena under investigation will have fewer difficulties and 
are more likely to come to common inferences than coders with different levels 
of familiarity, that is, with different levels of prior understanding that enters, as 
embodied in the understanding/explaining dialectic, any effort of structural 
analysis (RICŒUR 1991). Without such understanding of concrete situations 
that the generalization is supposed to summarize and explain, even natural 
scientists have been shown to have trouble reading and interpreting texts and 
graphs although these had been culled from undergraduate textbooks and 
courses of their own domain (ROTH, BOWEN & MASCIOTRA 2002). On the 
other hand, the more extended the collective experience of coding data, the 
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more consistent the interpretations and categorizations will be (SCHOENFELD 
1992). That is, people who have a lot of shared experiences and cultural back-
ground are very similar in the ways that they perceive and describe records. 
The question of how to obtain high inter-coder reliabilities is thereby solved.  
4. Conclusion 
A critical step that any book on method has to pass before I make a recommen-
dation is the “how-would-my-graduate-students-rate-it” test. For more than a 
decade, I have taught research design, statistics, and qualitative research meth-
ods to graduate students from different disciplines including nursing, educa-
tion, conflict management, native governance, and other departments within the 
school of human and social development. Based on this experience, and in 
particular students’ evaluations of different textbooks, I know that their recep-
tion of this book would be very unkind. I would neither select the book nor 
recommend it to others for selection as a resource in their teaching of research 
methods, cross-cultural or otherwise. (Of course, I would get the blame rather 
than the author because I selected it.)  
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